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I. INTRODUCTION
The experience of armed conflicts in the twentieth century shows
that if a state deliberately violates such fundamental principles of contem-
porary international law as the principles of the non-use of force and non-
intervention, it is highly unlikely that it will show greater respect towards
other norms protecting basic community interests. The Persian Gulf cri-
sis of 1990-91 confirms this experience once again. The actions of Iraq
shocked the consciousness of humanity not only because of the unlawful
and brutal subjugation of a small neighboring country but also because
the aggressor violated a number of generally recognized principles of in-
ternational law of a humanitarian character and long-standing norms of
diplomatic law.
While there are many different questions that can be raised in con-
nection with violations of these norms, the political legal issues involved
often are similar. A major component building these similarities is the
fact that both humanitarian and diplomatic law reflect deeply held com-
munity values. Violations of these norms may be serious breaches of in-
ternational law that trigger a special regime of responsibility. Yet,
notwithstanding the importance of the rules involved, the existing legal
structures fail to provide adequate mechanisms to secure their implemen-
tation and enforcement. The situation in Iraq and Kuwait dramatically
reveals that the weakest point of the existing international law system is
its implementation. As the international community is struggling in the
post-Cold War period to establish a new world order based on the rule of
law, it is worthwhile to reassess the available community responses to be-
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havior which so blatantly disregards emerging hopes for a safer and more
peaceful world.
It is well known that after Iraq invaded Kuwait, thousands of foreign-
ers were detained in Iraq as "guests" of Iraq, meaning hostages. In a
move unprecedented in modem history, Iraqi authorities decided to use
these "special guests" or civilian hostages for creating defensive "human
shields" around certain military bases, industrial cites and other potential
targets of a military attack. The international community also learned
that Iraq committed numerous acts of violence against foreign diplomatic
missions and their personnel while occupying Kuwait. In taking notice of
these unlawful acts, the United Nations Security Council expressed deep
concern "for the safety and well being of third-state nationals in Iraq and
Kuwait."1 It demanded that Iraq "permit and facilitate the immediate
departure from Kuwait and Iraq of the nationals of third countries."z
The Security Council also called on Iraq to "rescind its orders for the
closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and the withdrawal
of the immunity of their personnel." 3 In another resolution, the Security
Council demonstrated concern about "acts of violence against diplomatic
missions and their personnel in Kuwait." 4 It also expressed outrage at
"violations by Iraq of diplomatic premises in Kuwait and at the abduction
of personnel enjoying diplomatic immunity and foreign nationals who
were present in these premises." 5
Of primary importance here is Security Council Resolution 674,
which was devoted largely to violations of humanitarian and diplomatic
law. The Security Council used much stronger language when it con-
demned "the actions by the Iraqi authorities and occupying forces to take
third-state nationals hostage and to mistreat and oppress Kuwait and
third-state nationals." 6 The resolution expressed alarm "over the situa-
tion of nationals of third states in Kuwait and Iraq, including the person-
nel of the diplomatic and consular missions of such states." 7 The Security
Council demanded that "Iraqi authorities and occupying forces immedi-
ately cease and desist from taking third-state nationals hostage" and reaf-
firmed its demand that Iraq "immediately protect the safety and well-
being of diplomatic and consular personnel and premises in Kuwait and
1. UN SC Res 664, UN Doc S/RES/664 (1990) ("UN SC Res 664").
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. UN SC Res 667, UN Doc S/RES/667 (1990) ("UN SC Res 667").
5. Id.
6. UN SC Res 674, UN Doc S/RES/674 (1990) ("UN SC Res 674") (emphasis added).
7. Id.
8. Id.
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in Iraq, [and] take no action to hinder these diplomatic and consular mis-
sions in the performance of their functions." 9
There doubtless will be more detailed public information about spe-
cific violations of international law by Iraqi authorities at a later date.
The Security Council reminded the members of the international commu-
nity of the importance of collecting substantiated information on Iraq's
violations of humanitarian law. It also asked countries to make available
to the Security Council any information in their possession regarding
Iraqi actions during the crisis.10 This call will not remain unheeded."
The existing evidence is sufficient, however, for the purposes of a
general legal analysis of the relevant legal political issues raised by the first
phase of the Gulf crisis. From a broad perspective, Iraqi actions consti-
tute violations of certain fundamental legal principles deeply rooted in the
international community. Clearly, these are not mere technical breaches,
but violations of long-standing norms supported by all states, notwith-
standing differences in their social and political systems or ideological and
cultural traditions.
II. APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF HUMANITARIAN LAW
The laws of war long have prohibited the taking of hostages. The
Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War,' 2 to which Iraq is a contracting party, declares that "the
taking of hostages is prohibited."' 3 It also contains a rule that "the pres-
ence of a protected person may not be used to render certain points or
areas immune from military operation."' 4 The 1977 Additional Protocol
(Protocol 1) to the Geneva Convention' 5 reaffirms the ban on the taking
of hostages "at any time and in any place whatsoever, whether committed
by civilian or by military agents."' 6 The Protocol also contains a more
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. The United Nations itself might have been more active in this field. In this connection, it
may rely on its prior practice in establishing several fact-finding missions and ad-hoc investigatory
organs. See Question of Methods of Fact-Finding, UN GA Res 2329 (XXII), 22 UN GAOR Supp No
16, UN Doc A/6995 (1967). For support for such an approach on the doctrinal level, see G. Abi.
Saab, The Implementation of Humanitarian Law, in Antonio Cassese, ed, The New Humanitarian Law of
Armed Conflict 310, 332-33 (Oceana, 1979).
12. Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
[1955] 6 UST 3516, TIAS No 3365, 75 UNTS 287 (signed August 12, 1949; in force October 21,
1950) ("Fourth Geneva Convention").
13. Id at Art 34.
14. Id at Art 28.
15. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), 1125 UNTS 3 (signed June 8,
1977; in force December 7, 1978) ("Protocol I"). Iraq is not a party to this protocol.
16. Id at Art 75(2).
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detailed rule relating to the prohibition of "human shields." Protocol 1
states that "the presence or movements of the civilian population or indi-
vidual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune
from military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objec-
tives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede military operations."1 7
Whatever the state of treaty law and Iraqi obligations arising from it,
Iraq should be bound by general principles of law applicable to all states.
The taking of hostages also violates the general principle prohibiting the
deprivation of basic human rights. The International Court of Justice
confirmed this view in its judgment in the Case Concerning United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran. Commenting on the detention of
American hostages in Tehran, the Court found that:
Wrongfully to deprive human beings of their freedom and to subject
them to physical constraints in condition of hardship is in itself mani-
festly incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United
Nations, as well as with the fundamental principles enunciated in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.' 8
Under the laws of war, a general principle exists independently of
any treaty obligations that prohibits the taking of hostages. The basic
rules contained in the Geneva Conventions have passed into the corpus
of general customary law. The judgment of the International Court of
Justice in the Nicaragua Case supports such a view; it placed a special
emphasis on "the general principles of humanitarian law to which the
[Geneva] Conventions merely give specific expression."'19 International
legal doctrine supports this approach.20 Significantly, the Security Coun-
cil also appears to support the view that violations of such humanitarian
norms result not only from the breaches of treaty commitments, but also
from the infringement of general rules of law. Thus, when discussing
Iraq's failure to meet its international obligations with respect to the well-
being of third-state nationals, the Security Council reaffirmed "that Iraq
retains full responsibility in this regard under international humanitarian law
including, where applicable, the Fourth Geneva Convention." 2' The Se-
curity Council stressed that acts committed by Iraq constitute violations
not only of the Fourth Geneva Convention, but also of "international
law" and "general principles of international law."22
17. Id at Art 51(7).
18. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (Judgment) (US v Iran),
1980 ICJ 3, 42 (1980) ("Iran Hostages Case Judgment").
19. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Merits, Judgment)
(US v Nicaragua), 1986 ICJ 14, 114 (1986) ("Nicaragua Case").
20. For a detailed presentation, see Theodor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as
Customary Law (Oxford U Press, 1989).
21. UN SC Res 666, UN Doc S/RES/666 (1990) ("UN SC Res 666") (emphasis added).
22. UN SC Res 674 (cited in note 6).
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The taking of hostages is a "grave breach" of the Fourth Geneva
Convention.2 3 The perpetrators have a direct individual criminal respon-
sibility under international law and the principle of universal jurisdic-
tion.24 According to Protocol I, such breaches of the Protocol fall under
the definition of "war crimes."25 However, "grave breaches" of the rules
contained in the Fourth Geneva Convention and in Protocol I also would
be war crimes independent of any definition contained in Protocol I.
Acts such as the taking of hostages or the practice of using civilians as
"human shields" qualify as war crimes in any event under the principles
enunciated by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal,26 which have
been generally recognized and regarded as part of international law.
These considerations are of major importance for decision to punish
individual offenders committing war crimes. The Security Council al-
ready has issued a serious warning to perpetrators of war crimes on behalf
of the international community by stressing that "individuals who com-
mit or order the commission of grave breaches" of the Fourth Geneva
Convention are liable under it. 2 7 While from a policy perspective this
declaration is of great significance, it is not clear that the international
community can prosecute the war criminals as long as they remain under
the jurisdiction of Iraq. At this stage, the international community has
no central authority entitled to initiate criminal proceedings or impose
punishment on the offenders. The United Nations International Law
Commission (the "Commission") 28 still debates the question of establish-
ing an international criminal court or other international criminal trial
mechanisms with jurisdiction over persons alleged to have committed war
crimes as it continues its work on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind.29
23. Fourth Geneva Convention at Art 147 (cited in note 12).
24. Id at Art 146.
25. Protocol 1 at Art 85 (cited in note 15).
26. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the Euro-
pean Axis, 59 Stat 1544, 82 UNTS 279 (signed and in force August 8, 1945).
27. UN SC Res 670, UN Doc S/RES/670 (1990) ("UN SC Res 670"). See also UN SC Res 674
(cited in note 6).
28. The International Law Commission (the "Commission") has started to consider the ques-
tion of establishing an international criminal court upon the request of the U.N. General Assembly.
See International Criminal Responsibility of Individuals and Entities Engaged in Illicit Trafficking in
Narcotic Drugs Across National Frontiers and Other Transnational Criminal Activities: Establish-
ment of an International Criminal Court with Jurisdiction Over Such Crimes, UN GA Res 44/39, 44
UN GAOR Supp No 49, UN Doc A/44/49 (1989). For a detailed discussion of the prospects for an
international criminal court, see Michael P. Scharf, The Jury is Still Out on the Need for an International
Criminal Court, 1991 Duke J Comp & Intl L 135.
29. For a detailed discussion, see B. Graefrath, Universal Criminal Jurisdiction and an International
Criminal Court, to be published in 1 Eur J Intl L (1991) and the authors cited there.
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From a political legal perspective there are serious grounds to regard
certain rules of humanitarian law as norms of jus cogens. The United Na-
tions International Law Commission has pointed out that at least some of
the rules of humanitarian law "are, in the opinion of the Commission,
rules which impose obligations ofjus ogens ..... "30 There is evidence that
the prohibition against the taking of hostages may fall under this cate-
gory. 31 Violations of this prohibition and of other norms of special im-
portance to the international community will be a significant factor
shaping the regime of state responsibility Iraq must face in connection
with events in Kuwait.
III. APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF DIPLOMATIC LAW
Breaches of diplomatic law also concern principles of fundamental
importance for the international community. All members of the interna-
tional community recognize the critical importance of the right of diplo-
matic immunity both in times of war and peace. Iraq is bound to respect
these norms not only as a contracting party to the Vienna Conventions
on Diplomatic and Consular Relations32 but also under the principles of
customary law reflecting deeply rooted community traditions.
The International Court of Justice stressed the importance of diplo-
matic law in the Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff
in Tehran (Judgment). The Court emphasized the gravity of the Iranian
offense in taking the American diplomats hostage by noting that the obli-
gations breached by Iran were "not merely contractual.., but also obliga-
tions under general international law." 33 The Case Concerning United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (Provisional Measures) is also
of special significance in view of the fact that the Court put a special
emphasis on the "imperative obligations inherent in" diplomatic and con-
sular law.34 In the Iran Hostages Case (Judgment), the Court also empha-
sized the "imperative character of the legal obligations incumbent upon
the Iranian government.'' 35 The Court stressed that the taking of hos-
tages by Iran "undermine[s] the edifice of law carefully constructed...
30. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty.Second Session, 5 May-25 July
1980, UN GA Res 35/10, 35 UN GAOR Supp No 10, UN Doc A/35/10 at 98 (1980).
31. See Lauri Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (]us Cogens) in International Law 489 et seq (Hel-
sinki Finnish Lawyers' Pub Co, 1988).
32. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, [19721 23 UST 3227, TIAS No 7502, 500
UNTS 95 (signed April 18, 1961; in force April 24, 1964); Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions, [19701 21 UST 77, TIAS No 6820, 596 UNTS 261 (signed April 24, 1963; in force March 19,
1967).
33. Iran Hostages Case Judgment, 1980 ICJ at 31 (cited in note 18).
34. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (Provisional Measures),
(US v Iran), 1979 ICJ 1, 20 (1979) ("Iran Hostages Case Provisional Measures").
35. Iran Hostages Case Judgment, 1980 ICJ at 41 (cited in note 18).
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over a period of centuries.... [Riules developed to maintain the ordered
progress of relations between [states] should be constantly and scrupu-
lously respected." 36
This confirmation of the importance of diplomatic law for the rela-
tions between members of the international community also applies to
Iraq. In condemning the violations by Iraq of diplomatic premises in Ku-
wait and the abduction of personnel enjoying diplomatic immunity, the
Security Council stressed the importance of the relevant principles of law
in language resembling the Court's pronouncement. The Security Coun-
cil stated that the Iraqi actions constitute "aggressive acts and a flagrant
violation of its international obligations which strike at the root of the
conduct of international relations." 37
Although the pronouncements just quoted do not expressly affirm
that norms relating to diplomatic immunity are principles of jus cogens,
violations of these principles are regarded as affecting the interests of the
entire international community. In other words, here we deal with viola-
tions of obligations "toward the international community as a whole" 38
which, according to the judgment of the International Court of Justice in
the Barcelona Traction Case, are "the concern of all states." 39 Violations
of humanitarian law such as the taking of hostages also involve norms
affecting the fundamental interests of the international community.
IV. REGIME OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY
The foregoing considerations will play an important role in establish-
ing the regime of state responsibility applicable to actions of Iraq during
the invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Since the Iraqi actions are seri-
ous breaches of international obligations affecting the interests of the in-
ternational community as a whole, at least some of these acts may be
international crimes. An international crime is defined as an "interna-
tionally wrongful act which results from the breach by a State of an inter-
national obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental
interests of the international community that its breach is recognized as a
crime by that community as a whole." 40 While at this stage of the devel-
opment of the international legal order the exact legal consequences of
the characterization of a wrongful act as an international crime are a mat-
36. Id at 43.
37. UN SC Res 667 (cited in note 4).
38. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain),
1970 ICJ 1, 32 (1970) ("Barcelona Traction Case").
39. Id at 32.
40. Draft Articles on State Responsibility at Art 19(2), Report of the International Law Commission
on the Work of Its Twenty.Eighth Session 3 May.23 July 1976, UN Doc A/31/l0, 31 UN GAOR Supp
No 10, reprinted in 2(2) YB Intl L Comm 75 (1976).
Vol. 1991:125
132 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW Vol. 1991:125
ter for debate, 41 there appears to be a consensus that from a broad polit-
ical legal perspective crimes of states are likely to encounter a much
stronger condemnation by the international community than a wrongful
act. It is also clear that not only directly affected states, but also the inter-
national community as a whole, are interested in the enforcement of the
relevant fundamental rules of humanitarian and diplomatic law. In view
of this, the perpetrating state hardly can hope to avoid international re-
sponsibility as a result of a possible general toleration of its unlawful
activities.
While these policy considerations supporting the case against Iraq
are important, at this time the international community lacks compulsory
enforcement structures to deal effectively with violations of basic commu-
nity norms. There is only one area of law in which the international com-
munity has created a special regime of responsibility and a special organ,
the United Nations, dealing with violations of fundamental community
norms. However, the enforcement functions of the Security Council re-
late only to enumerated violations such as threats to the peace, breaches
of the peace, and acts of aggression.42 Under the prevailing view the Se-
curity Council lacks the power to deal with any other violations of basic
community norms. Still, in some cases it may be indirectly involved in
implementing norms not necessarily related to the enumerated violations.
Thus, by rejecting a narrow interpretation of its functions under the
United Nations Charter, the Security Council emerged during the Gulf
crisis as a community organ willing to deal with broader legal issues result-
ing from the Iraqi invasion into Kuwait. The Security Council reaffirmed
that under international law Iraq "is liable for any loss, damage or injury
arising in regard to Kuwait and third states, and their nationals and cor-
porations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait." 43
By dealing with these legal issues, the Security Council did not determine
what remedies might be used by states for restitution or financial compen-
sation. However, the relevant Security Council resolution envisages that
certain "arrangements... may be established in accordance with interna-
tional law." 44
41. For a detailed discussion, see H. H. Weiler, Antonio Cassese, and Marina Spinedi, eds,
International Crimes of States: A Critical Analysis of the ILC's Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility (de
Gruyter, 1989).
42. See Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 59 Stat 1031, Treaty Ser No 993, 1
UNTS xvi (signed June 26, 1945; in force October 24, 1945).
43. UN SC Res 674 (cited in note 6).
44. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
While the specific form these future arrangements might take is not
clear, grave breaches of humanitarian and diplomatic law certainly will be
among charges which the international community will continue to press
against the perpetrating state and its nationals. Iraq cannot become a
normal member of the international community as long as it fails to re-
store the previous situation and to satisfy claims arising from its wrongful
acts. In a world in which there are no supranational courts or similar
institutions able to punish an offender, there is no other way but to rely
primarily on the community pressure as a major tool to promote the rule
of law.

